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Abstract
Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has
been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted
voting appears in many important natural settings. In this paper, we study the complexity of controlling the
outcome of weighted elections through adding and deleting voters. We obtain polynomial-time algorithms,
NP-completeness results, and for many NP-complete cases, approximation algorithms. In particular, for
scoring rules we completely characterize the complexity of weighted voter control. Our work shows that
for quite a few important cases, either polynomial-time exact algorithms or polynomial-time approximation
algorithms exist.
1 Introduction
In many real-world election systems the voters come with weights. Examples range from stockholder elec-
tions weighted by shares, to the US Electoral College, to the often-used example of the Nassau County
Board of Supervisors, to (in effect) any parliamentary system in which the parties typically vote as blocks,
to Sweden’s system of wealth-weighted voting instituted in 1866 (and no longer used) where “the wealthiest
members of the rural communities received as many as 5,000 votes” and “in 10 percent of the districts the
weighted votes of just three voters could be decisive” [Con11].
So it is not surprising that in the study of manipulative attacks on elections, weighted voting has been given
great attention. For bribery and manipulation, two of the three most studied types of manipulative attacks on
elections, study of the case of weighted voters has been extensively conducted. Yet for the remaining one of
the three most studied types of attacks on elections, so-called control attacks, almost no attention has been
given to the case of weighted voting; to the best of our knowledge, the only time this issue has been previously
raised is in two M.S./Ph.D. theses [Rus07, Lin12]. This lack of attention is troubling, since the key types of
control attacks, such as adding and deleting voters, certainly do occur in many weighted elections.
We study the complexity in weighted elections of arguably the most important types of control—adding
and deleting voters—for various election systems. We focus on scoring rules, families of scoring rules, and
(weak)Condorcet-consistent rules. Control by deleting (adding) voters asks whether in a given election a
given candidate can be made to win by deleting (adding) at most a certain number of the voters (at most a
certain number of the members of the pool of potential additional voters). These control types model issues
that are found in many electoral settings, ranging from human to electronic. They are (abstractions of) issues
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often faced by people seeking to steer an election, such as experts doing campaign management, and deciding
for example which k people to offer rides to the polls.
Control was introduced (without weights) in 1992 in the seminal paper by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92]. Control has been the subject of much attention since. That attention, and the present pa-
per, are part of the line of work, started by Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89, BO91, BTT92],
that seeks to determine for which types of manipulative attacks on elections the attacker’s task requires just
polynomial-time computation. For a more detailed discussion of this line of work, we point the reader to the
related work section at the end of the paper and to the surveys [FHHR09, FHH10, BCE13].
Our main results are as follows (see Section 5 for tables summarizing our results). First, in Section 3.1
we provide a detailed study of the complexity of voter control under scoring protocols, for the case of fixed
numbers of candidates. We show that both constructive control by adding voters and constructive control by
deleting voters are in P for t-approval (and so this also covers plurality and t ′-veto1) and are NP-complete
otherwise. It is interesting to compare this result to an analogous theorem regarding weighted coalitional
manipulation: There are cases where the complexities of voter control and manipulation are the same (e.g.,
for plurality or for Borda) but there are also cases where voter control is easier (t-approval for t ≥ 2, for
elections with more than t candidates). Is it ever possible that weighted voter control is harder than weighted
voting manipulation? We show that weighted voter control is NP-hard for (weak)Condorcet-consistent rules
with at least three candidates. Since weighted coalitional manipulation for the 3-candidate Llull system is in
P [FHS08], together with the fact that Llull is weakCondorcet-consistent, this implies that there is a setting
where weighted voter control is harder than weighted coalitional manipulation.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we focus on the complexity of weighted voter control under t-approval and t-
veto, for the case of unbounded numbers of candidates. At the start of Section 3.2, we will explain why
these are the most interesting cases. In Section 3.2 we resolve six problems left open by Lin [Lin12]. We
establish the complexity of weighted control by adding voters for 2-approval, 2-veto, and 3-approval, and of
weighted control by deleting voters for 2-approval, 2-veto, and 3-veto. In Section 3.3, we give polynomial-
time approximation algorithms for weighted voter control under t-approval and t-veto. Our algorithms seek
to minimize the number of voters that are added or deleted.
We believe that the complexity of weighted voter control, and more generally the complexity of attacks
on weighted elections, is an important and interesting research direction that deserves much further study.
In particular, our research suggests that it is worthwhile to seek f (·)-approximation results for weighted
elections problems and that doing so can lead to interesting algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of computational complexity theory and the
theory of algorithms. Below we provide relevant definitions and conventions regarding elections, election
rules, and control in elections. We also review some NP-complete problems that we use in our reductions.
Elections
We take an election to be a pair E = (C,V ), where C is a set of candidates and V is a collection of voters. Each
voter has a preference order over the set C. A preference order is a total, linear order that ranks the candidates
from the most preferred one to the least preferred one. For example, if C = {a,b,c} and some voter likes
a best, then b, and then c, then his or her preference order is a > b > c. In weighted elections, each voter
1If the number of candidates is fixed, then t-veto can be expressed as (m− t)-approval, where m is the number of candidates. If the
number of candidates is unbounded, then t-veto is not t ′-approval.
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v also has a positive integer weight ω(v). A voter of weight ω(v) is treated by the election system as ω(v)
unweighted voters. Given two collections of voters, V and W , we write V +W to denote their concatenation.
Election Rules
An election rule (or voting rule) is a function R that given an election E = (C,V ) returns a subset R(E)⊆C,
namely those candidates that are said to win the election.
An m-candidate scoring rule is defined through a nonincreasing vector α = (α1, . . . ,αm) of nonnegative
integers. For each voter v, each candidate c receives αpos(v,c) points, where pos(v,c) is the position of c in v’s
preference order. The candidates with the maximum total score are the winners. Given an election E and a
voting rule R that assigns scores to the candidates, we write scoreE(c) to denote c’s total score in E under R.
The voting rule used will always be clear from context. Many election rules are defined through families of
scoring rules, with one scoring vector for each possible number of candidates. For example:
1. Plurality rule uses vectors of the form (1,0, . . . ,0).
2. t-approval uses vectors (α1, . . . ,αm), where αi = 1 for each i∈ {1, . . . , t}, and αi = 0 for i > t. By t-veto
we mean the system that for m candidates uses the (m− t)-approval scoring vector. For m-candidate
t-approval and t-veto systems we will often treat each vote as a 0/1 m-dimensional approval vector that
indicates which candidates receive points from the vote. Naturally, such a vector contains exactly t
ones for t-approval and exactly t zeroes for t-veto.2
3. Borda’s rule uses vectors of the form (m− 1,m− 2, . . .,0), where m is the number of candidates.
Given an election E = (C,V ), a candidate c is a (weak) Condorcet winner if for every other candidate
d ∈ C−{c} it holds that more than half (at least half) of the voters prefer c to d. Note that it is possible
that there is no (weak) Condorcet winner in a given election. We say that a rule R is Condorcet-consistent
if whenever there is a Condorcet winner he or she is the sole winner elected under R. Analogously, a rule
is weakCondorcet-consistent if it elects exactly the weak Condorcet winners whenever they exist. Every
weakCondorcet-consistent system is Condorcet-consistent, but the converse does not always hold.
There are many Condorcet-consistent rules. We will briefly touch upon the Copeland family of rules and
the Maximin rule. For a given election E = (C,V ) and two distinct candidates c,d ∈ C, we let NE(c,d) be
the number of voters that prefer c to d. Let α be a rational number, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Under Copelandα the score
of candidate c ∈C is defined as:
‖{d ∈C−{c} | NE(c,d)> NE(d,c)}‖+α‖{d ∈C−{c} | NE(c,d) = NE(d,c)}‖,
and under Maximin the score of candidate c ∈ C is defined as mind∈C−{c}NE(c,d). The candidates with
the highest score are winners. Llull is another name for Copeland1. Clearly, Llull and Maximin are
weakCondorcet-consistent.
Electoral Control
We focus on constructive control by adding/deleting voters in weighted elections. However, there are also
other standard types of control studied in the literature (e.g., control by adding/deleting candidates and various
forms of partitioning of candidates and voters; we point the reader to Section 4 for a discussion of related
work).
2We emphasize that such a view of t-approval and t-veto is correct in settings where the set of candidates remains fixed. If the set of
candidates were to change (e.g., as in control by adding/deleting candidates), then we would have to use the standard, preference-order-
based definition.
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Definition 2.1. Let R be a voting rule. In both weighted constructive control by adding voters under rule
R (R-WCCAV) and weighted constructive control by deleting voters under rule R (R-WCCDV), our input
contains a set of candidates C, a collection of weighted voters V (sometimes referred to as the registered
voters) with preferences over C, a preferred candidate p ∈C, and a nonnegative integer k. In R-WCCAV we
also have an additional collection W of weighted voters (sometimes referred to as the unregistered voters)
with preferences over C. In these problems we ask the following questions:
1. R-WCCAV: Is there a subcollection W ′ of W , of at most k voters, such that p ∈ R(C,V+W ′)?
2. R-WCCDV: Is there a subcollection V ′ of V , of at most k voters, such that p ∈ R(C,V−V ′)?
Although in this paper we focus primarily on constructive control, Section 3.1 makes some comments
about the so-called destructive variants of control problems. Given a voting rule R, weighted destructive
control by adding voters under rule R (R-WDCAV) and weighted destructive control by deleting voters under
rule R (R-WDCDV) are defined analogously to their constructive variants, with the only difference being that
the goal is to ensure that the distinguished candidate p is not a winner.
Note that in the above definitions the parameter k defines the number of voters that can be added/deleted,
and not the total weight of the voters that can be added/deleted. This is a standard approach when modeling
strategic behavior in weighted elections. For example, in the study of “R-weighted-bribery” [FHH09], bribing
each weighted voter has unit cost regardless of the voter’s weight.
We will consider approximation algorithms for WCCAV and WCCDV under t-approval and t-veto. When
doing so, we will assume that input instances do not contain the integer k. Rather, the goal is simply to find
(when success is possible at all) as small as possible a collection of voters to add/delete such that p is a winner
of the resulting election. For a positive integer h, an h-approximation algorithm for WCCAV/WCCDV is an
algorithm that (when success is possible at all) always finds a solution that adds/deletes at most h times as
many voters as an optimal action does. The notion of an f (·)-approximation algorithm for WCCAV/WCCDV
is defined analogously, where the argument to f is some variable related to the problem or instance. And the
meaning of O( f (·))-approximation algorithms will be similarly clear from context. It is natural to worry
about how the above seemingly incomplete definitions interact with the possibility that success might be
impossible regardless of how many votes one adds/deletes. However, for t-approval WCCDV and t-veto
WCCDV (and indeed, for any scoring rule), it is always possible to ensure that p is a winner, for example
by deleting all the voters. For t-approval WCCAV and t-veto WCCAV, it is possible to ensure p’s victory
through adding voters if and only if p is a winner after we add all the unregistered voters that approve of p.
These observations make it particularly easy to discuss and study approximation algorithms for t-approval
and for t-veto, because we can always easily check whether there is some solution. For voting rules that don’t
have this easy-checking property, such an analysis might be much more complicated. (The reader may wish
to compare our work with Brelsford et al.’s attempt at framing a general election-problem approximation
framework [BFH+08].)
In this paper we do not consider candidate-control cases (such as weighted constructive control by
adding candidates and weighted constructive control by deleting candidates, WCCAC and WCCDC). The
reason is that for a bounded number of candidates, when winner determination in the given weighted elec-
tion system is in P it holds that both WCCAC and WCCDC are in P by brute-force search. On the other
hand, if the number of candidates is not bounded then candidate control is already NP-hard for plural-
ity (and t-approval and t-veto, in both the constructive setting and the destructive setting) even without
weights [BTT92, HHR07, EFS11, Lin12]. Furthermore, many results for candidate control under Condorcet-
consistent rules can be claimed in the weighted setting. For example, for the Maximin rule and for the
Copeland family of rules, hardness results translate immediately, and it is straightforward to see that the
existing polynomial-time algorithms for the unweighted cases also work for the weighted cases [FHH11b].
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Weighted Coalitional Manipulation
One of our goals is to compare the complexity of weighted voter control with the complexity of weighted
coalitional manipulation (WCM). WCM is similar to WCCAV in that we also add voters, but it differs in
that (a) we have to add exactly a given number of voters, and (b) we can pick the preference orders of the
added voters. It is quite interesting to see how the differences in these problems’ definitions affect their
complexities.
Definition 2.2. Let R be a voting rule. In R-WCM we are given a weighted election (C,V ), a preferred
candidate p ∈C, and a sequence k1, . . . ,kn of positive integers. We ask whether it is possible to construct a
collection W = (w1, . . . ,wn) of n voters such that for each i, 1≤ i≤ n, ω(wi) = ki, and p is a winner of the R
election (C,V+W ). The voters in W are called manipulators.
Computational Complexity
In our NP-hardness proofs we use reductions from the following NP-complete problems.
Definition 2.3. An instance of Partition consists of a sequence (k1, . . . ,kt) of positive integers whose sum is
even. We ask whether there is a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , t} such that ∑i∈I ki = 12 ∑ti=1 ki.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we will use the following restricted version of Partition, where we have
greater control over the numbers involved in the problem.
Definition 2.4. An instance of Partition ′ consists of a sequence (k1, . . . ,kt) of positive integers, whose sum is
even, such that (a) t is an even number, and (b) for each ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, it holds that ki ≥ 1t+1 ∑tj=1 k j. We ask
whether there is a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , t} of cardinality t2 such that ∑i∈I ki = 12 ∑ti=1 ki.
Showing the NP-completeness of this problem is a standard exercise. (In particular, the NP-completeness
of a variant of this problem is established as [FHH09, Lemma 2.3]; the same approach can be used to show the
NP-completeness of Partition′.) Our remaining hardness proofs are based on reductions from a restricted ver-
sion of the well-known Exact-Cover-By-3-Sets problem. This restricted version is still NP-complete [GJ79].
Definition 2.5. An instance of X3C ′ consists of a set B = {b1, . . . ,b3t} and a family S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} of
3-element subsets of B such that every element of B occurs in at least one and in at most three sets in S . We
ask whether S contains an exact cover for B, i.e., whether there exist t sets in S whose union is B.
3 Results
We now present our results. In Section 3.1 we focus on fixed numbers of candidates in scoring protocols and
(weak)Condorcet-consistent rules. Then in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we consider case of an unbounded number
of candidates, for t-approval and t-veto.
3.1 Scoring Protocols and Manipulation Versus Control
It is well-known that weighted manipulation of scoring protocols is always hard, unless the scoring protocol is
in effect plurality or triviality [HH07]. In contrast, weighted voter control is easy for m-candidate t-approval.
Theorem 3.1. For all m and t, WCCAV and WCCDV for m-candidate t-approval are in P.
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Proof. Let (C,V,W, p,k) be an instance of WCCAV for m-candidate t-approval. We can assume that we add
only voters who approve of p. We can also assume that we add the heaviest voters with a particular set of
approvals, i.e., if we add ℓ voters approving p,c1, . . . ,ct−1, we can assume that we added the ℓ heaviest voters
approving p,c1, . . . ,ct−1. Since there are only
(
m−1
t−1
)
—which is a constant—different sets of approvals to
consider, it suffices to try all sequences of nonnegative integers k1, . . . ,k(m−1t−1 ) whose sum is at most k, and for
each such sequence to check whether adding the heaviest ki voters of the ith approval collection makes p a
winner.
The same argument works for WCCDV. Here, we delete only voters that do not approve of p, and again
we delete the heaviest voters for each approval collection.
One might think that the argument above works for any scoring protocol, but this is not the case. For
example, consider the 3-candidate Borda instance where V consists of one weight-1 voter b > p > a and W
consists of a weight-2 and a weight-1 voter with preference order a > p > b. Then adding the weight-1 voter
makes p a winner, but adding the weight-2 voter does not. And, in fact, we have the following result.3
Theorem 3.2. WCCAV and WCCDV for Borda are NP-complete. This result holds even when restricted to a
fixed number m≥ 3 of candidates.
Proof. We reduce from Partition. Given a sequence k1, . . . ,kt of positive integers that sum to 2K, construct an
election with one registered voter of weight K voting b > p > a > · · · , and t unregistered voters with weights
k1, . . . ,kt voting a > p > b > · · · . Set the addition limit to t. It is easy to see that for p to become a winner,
b’s score (relative to p) needs to go down by at least K, while a’s score (relative to p) should not go up by
more than K. It follows that k1, . . . ,kt has a partition if and only if p can be made a winner.
We use the same construction for the deleting voters case. Now, all voters are registered and the deletion
limit is t. Since we can’t delete all voters, and since our goal is to make p a winner, we can’t delete the one
voter voting b > p > a > · · · . The rest of the argument is identical to the adding voters case.
Interestingly, it is possible to extend the above proof to work for all scoring protocols other than t-approval
(the main idea stays the same, but the technical details are more involved). And so, regarding the complexity
of WCCAV and WCCDV for scoring protocols with a fixed number of candidates, the cases of Theorem 3.1
are the only P cases (assuming P 6= NP).
Theorem 3.3. For each scoring protocol (α1, . . . ,αm), if there exists an i, 1 < i < m, such that α1 > αi > αm,
then WCCAV and WCCDV for (α1, . . . ,αm) are NP-complete.
Proof. Let α = (α1, . . . ,αm) be a scoring protocol such that there is an i such that α1 > αi > αm. Let x be
the third largest value in the set {α1, . . . ,αm}. We will show that WCCAV and WCCDV are NP-complete for
scoring protocol β = (β1, . . . ,βm) = (α1 − x, . . . ,αm− x). While formally we have defined scoring protocols
to contain only nonnegative values, using β simplifies our construction and does not affect the correctness of
the proof. To further simplify notation, given some candidates x1, . . . ,xℓ, by F [x1 = βi1 ,x2 = βi2 , . . . ,xℓ = βiℓ ]
we mean a fixed preference order that ensures, under β , that each x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, is ranked at a position that
gives βi j points. (The candidates not mentioned in the F [. . .] notation are ranked arbitrarily.) We let γ1, γ2,
and γ3 be the three highest values in the set {β1, . . . ,βm}. Clearly, β1 = γ1 > γ2 > γ3 = 0.
We give a reduction from Partition to β -WCCAV (the membership of β -WCCAV in NP is clear); let
(k1, . . . ,kt) be an instance of Partition, i.e., a sequence of positive integers that sum to 2K. We form an
election E = (C,V ) where C = {p,a,b,c4, . . . ,cm} and where the collection V contains the following three
groups of voters (for the WCCAV part of the proof below, we set T = 1; for the WCCDV part of the proof
we will use the same construction but with a larger value of T ):
3We mention in passing that an analogue of this theorem in the model in which we are bounding the total weight of votes that can be
added/deleted was obtained by Russell [Rus07].
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1. A group of T voters, each with weight K and preference order F [b = γ1,a = γ2, p = 0].
2. A group of T voters, each with weight K and preference order F [p = γ1,b = γ2,a = 0].
3. For each ci ∈ C, there are 6 collections of 2T voters, one collection for each permutation (x,y,z) of
(p,a,b); the voters in each collection have weight K and preference order F[x = β1,y = β2,z = β3,ci =
βm].
Let M be the number of points that each of a, b, and p receive from the third group of voters (each of these
candidates receives the same number of points from these voters). For each ci ∈ C and each x ∈ {p,a,b}, x
receives at least 4TKγ1 points more than ci from the voters in the third group (in each vote in the third group,
x receives at least as many points as ci, and there are two collections of 2T voters where x receives γ1 points
and ci receives γm ≤ 0 points). Thus it holds that our candidates have the following scores:
1. p has M+TKγ1 points,
2. a has M+TKγ2 points,
3. b has M+TK(γ1 + γ2) points, and
4. each candidate ci ∈C has at most M− 2TKγ1 points.
As a result, b is the unique winner. There are t unregistered voters with weights T k1, . . . ,T kt , each with
preference order F = [a = γ1, p = γ2,b = 0]. We set the addition limit to be t. It is clear that irrespective of
which voters are added, none of the candidates in {c4, . . . ,cm} becomes a winner.
If there is a subcollection of (k1, . . . ,kt) that sums to K, then adding corresponding unregistered voters
to the election ensures that all three of p, a, and b are winners. On the other hand, assume that there are
unregistered voters of total weight T L, whose addition to the election ensures that p is among the winners.
For p to have score at least as high as b, we must have that L ≥ K. However, for a not to have score higher
than p, it must be that L ≤ K. This means that L = K. Thus it is possible to ensure that p is a winner of the
election by adding at most t unregistered voters if and only if there is a subcollection of (k1, . . . ,kt) that sums
to K. And, completing the proof, we note that the reduction can be carried out in polynomial time.
Let us now move on to the case of WCCDV. We will use the same construction, but with the following
modifications:
1. Our reduction is now from Partition′. Thus without loss of generality we can assume that t is an even
number and that for each i, 1 ≤ i≤ t, it holds that ki ≥ 11+t 2K.
2. We set T =
⌈
t
2 (t + 1)
γ1
γ1−γ2
⌉
+1 (the reasons for this choice of T will become apparent in the course of
the proof; intuitively it is convenient to think of T as of a large value that, nonetheless, is polynomially
bounded with respect to t).
3. We include the unregistered voters as “the fourth group of voters.”
4. We set the deletion limit to t2 .
By the same reasoning as in the WCCAV case, it is easy to see that if there is a size- t2 subcollection of
k1, . . . ,kt that sums to K, then deleting the corresponding voters ensures that p is among the winners (together
with a and b). We now show that if there is a way to delete up to t2 voters to ensure that p is among the
winners, then the deleted voters must come from the fourth group, must have total weight K, and there must
be exactly t2 of them. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that it is possible to ensure p’s victory by
deleting up to t2 voters, of whom fewer than
t
2 come from the fourth group. Let s be the number of deleted
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voters from the fourth group (s < t2 ) and let x be a real number such that xT K is their total weight. We have
that xT K is at most:
xT K ≤ 2T K− t− s
1+ t
(2TK)≤ 2TK
(
1−
t
2 + 1
1+ t
)
= T K
t
1+ t
.
That is, we have 0 ≤ x ≤ t1+t . Prior to deleting any voters, a has T K(γ1 − γ2) points more than p. After
deleting the s voters from the fourth group, this difference decreases to T K(1−x)(γ1−γ2). If we additionally
delete up to t2 voters from the first three groups of voters, each with weight K, then the difference between
the scores of a and p decreases, at most, to the following value (note that in each deleted vote both a and p
are ranked at positions where they receive γ1, γ2 or 0 points):
T K(1− x)(γ1− γ2)−
t
2
Kγ1 ≥ T K
1
t + 1
(γ1− γ2)−
t
2
Kγ1 = K
(
T (γ1− γ2)
t + 1
−
t
2 (t + 1)γ1
t + 1
)
> 0.
The final inequality follows by our choice of T . The above calculation shows that if there is a way to ensure
p’s victory by deleting up to t2 voters then it requires deleting exactly
t
2 voters from the fourth group. The
same reasoning as in the case of WCCAV shows that these t2 deleted voters must correspond to a size-
t
2
subcollection of (k1, . . . ,kt) that sums to K.
As a side comment, we mention that WDCAV and WDCDV for scoring protocols (that is, the destructive
variants of WCCAV and WCCDV) have simple polynomial-time algorithms: It suffices to loop through all
candidates c, c 6= p, and greedily add/delete voters to boost the score of c relative to p as much as possible.
Combining Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, we obtain the following corollary, which we contrast with an analogous
result for WCM [HH07].
Corollary 3.4. For each scoring protocol (α1, . . . ,αm) the problems WCCAV and WCCDV are NP-complete
if ‖{α1, . . . ,αm}‖ ≥ 3 and are in P otherwise.
Theorem 3.5 (Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [HH07]). For each scoring protocols (α1, . . . ,αm), m≥ 2,
WCM is NP-complete if α2 > αm and is in P otherwise.
We see that for scoring protocols with a fixed number m of candidates, either WCM is harder than
WCCAV and WCCDV (for the case of t-approval with 2 ≤ t < m), or the complexity of WCM, WCCAV,
and WCCDV is the same (P-membership for plurality and triviality, and NP-completeness for the remaining
cases). For other voting rules, it is also possible that WCM is easier than WCCAV and WCCDV.
Theorem 3.6. For every weakCondorcet-consistent election system and for every Condorcet-consistent elec-
tion system, WCCAV and WCCDV are NP-hard. This result holds even when restricted to a fixed number
m≥ 3 of candidates.
Proof. To show that WCCAV is NP-hard, we reduce from Partition. Given a sequence k1, . . . ,kt of positive
integers that sum to 2K, construct an election with two registered voters, one voter with weight 1 voting
p > a > b > · · · and one voter with weight 2K voting b > p > a > · · · , and t unregistered voters with weights
2k1, . . . ,2kt voting a > p > b > · · · . Set the addition limit to t. Suppose we add unregistered voters to the
election with a total vote weight equal to 2L.
• If L < K, then b is the Condorcet winner, and thus the unique winner of the election.
• If L > K, then a is the Condorcet winner, and thus the unique winner of the election.
• If L = K, then p is the Condorcet winner, and thus the unique winner of the election.
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The WCCDV case uses the same construction. Now, all voters are registered and the deletion limit is t. Since
we can delete at most t of our t + 2 voters, and since our goal is to make p a winner, we can’t delete the sole
voter voting b > p > a, since then a would be the Condorcet winner. The rest of the argument is similar to
the adding voters case.
Let Condorcet be the election system whose winner set is exactly the set of Condorcet winners. Let
weakCondorcet be the election system whose winner set is exactly the set of weak Condorcet winners.
Corollary 3.7. For Condorcet and weakCondorcet, WCM is in Pand WCCAV and WCCDV are NP-complete.
This result holds even when restricted to a fixed number m ≥ 3 of candidates.
Proof. It is immediate that WCM for Condorcet and weakCondorcet are in P. To see if we have a “yes”-
instance of WCM, it suffices to check whether letting all the manipulators rank p (the preferred candidate)
first and ranking all the remaining candidates in some arbitrary order ensures p’s victory. NP-completeness
of WCCAV and WCCDV follows directly from Theorem 3.6.
Condorcet and weakCondorcet do not always have winners. For those who prefer their voting systems to
always have at least one winner, we note that WCM for 3-candidate Llull is in P [FHS08].
Corollary 3.8. For 3-candidate Llull, WCM is in P and WCCAV and WCCDV are NP-complete.
The main results of this section are also presented in Table 1 of Section 5.
3.2 t-Approval and t-Veto with an Unbounded Number of Candidates
Let us now look at the cases of t-approval and t-veto rules, for an unbounded number of candidates. The
reason we focus on these is that these are the most interesting families of scoring protocols whose complexity
has not already been resolved in the previous section. The reason we say that is that Theorem 3.3 shows that
whenever we have at least three distinct values in a scoring vector, we have NP-completeness. And so any
family that at even one number of candidates has three distinct values in its scoring vector is NP-hard for
WCCAV and WCCDV. Thus the really interesting cases are indeed t-approval and t-veto.
Our starting point here is the work of Lin [Lin12], which showed that for t ≥ 4, WCCAV for t-approval
and WCCDV for t-veto are NP-complete, and that for t ≥ 3, WCCDV for t-approval and WCCAV for t-
veto are NP-complete. These results hold even for the unweighted case. It is also known that the remaining
unweighted cases are in P [BTT92, Lin12] and that WCCAV and WCCDV for plurality and veto are in
P [Lin12]. In this section, we look at and solve the remaining open cases, WCCAV for 2-approval, 3-approval,
and 2-veto, and WCCDV for 2-approval, 2-veto, and 3-veto. We start by showing that 2-approval-WCCAV
is in P.
Theorem 3.9. WCCAV for 2-approval is in P.
Proof. We claim that Algorithm 1 solves 2-approval-WCCAV in polynomial time. (In this algorithm and the
proof of correctness, whenever we speak of the r heaviest voters in voter set X , we mean the min(r,‖X‖)
heaviest voters in X .)
It is easy to see that we never reject incorrectly in the repeat-until, assuming that we don’t incorrectly
delete voters from W . It is also easy to see that if we add r voters approving {p,c}, we may assume that we
add the r heaviest voters approving {p,c} (this is also crucial in the proof of Theorem 3.1), and so we never
delete voters incorrectly in the second for loop in the repeat-until.
If we get through the repeat-until without rejecting, and we have fewer than k voters left in W , then adding
all of W is the best we can do (since all voters in W approve p).
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Algorithm 1: 2-approval-WCCAV
Input: (C,V,W, p,k)
forall c ∈C−{p} do
let sc = score(C,V )(c)− score(C,V )(p).
Delete from W all voters that do not approve of p.
repeat
forall c ∈C−{p} do
if the sum of the weights of the k heaviest voters in W that do not approve of c is less than sc then reject
// It is impossible to get score(c)≤ score(p) by adding less than or equal to k voters from W .
forall c ∈C−{p} and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1} do
if the sum of the weights of the k− ℓ heaviest voters in W that do not approve of c is less than sc then
delete from W all voters approving c except for the ℓ−1 heaviest such voters.
// We need to add at least k− ℓ+1 voters that do not approve of c, and so we can add at most ℓ−1
voters approving c.
until no more changes.
if ‖W‖ ≥ k then accept // We can make p a winner by adding the k heaviest voters from W .
if ‖W‖< k then
if adding all of W will make p a winner then accept else reject
Finally, if we get through the repeat-until, and we have at least k voters left in W , then adding the k heaviest
voters from W will make p a winner. Why? Let c be a candidate in C−{p}. Let r be the number of voters
from W that are added and that approve of c. Since we made it through the repeat-until, we know that [the
sum of the weights of the k heaviest voters in W that do not approve of c] is at least sc. We will show that after
adding the voters, score(c)− score(p)≤ 0, which implies that p is a winner. If r = 0, score(c)− score(p) =
sc - [the sum of the weights of the k heaviest voters in W ] ≤ 0. If r > 0, then [the sum of the weights of the
k− r heaviest voters in W that do not approve of c] is at least sc (for otherwise we would have at most r− 1
voters approving c left in W ). And so score(c)− score(p) = sc - [the sum of the weights of the k− r heaviest
voters in W that do not approve of c] ≤ 0.
Theorem 3.10. WCCDV for 2-veto is in P.
Instead of proving this theorem directly, we show a more general relation between the complexity of
t-approval/t-veto WCCAV and WCCDV.
Theorem 3.11. For each fixed t, it holds that t-veto-WCCDV (t-approval-WCCDV) polynomial-time many-
one reduces to t-approval-WCCAV (t-veto-WCCAV).
Proof. We first give a reduction from t-veto-WCCDV to t-approval-WCCAV. The idea is that deleting a t-
veto vote v from t-veto election (C,V ) is equivalent, in terms of net effect on the scores, to adding a t-approval
vote v′ to this election, where v′ approves exactly of the t candidates that v disapproves of. The problem with
this approach is that we are to reduce t-veto-WCCDV to t-approval-WCCAV and thus we have to show how
to implement t-veto scores with t-approval votes.
Let (C,V, p,k) be an instance of t-veto-WCCDV, where V = (v1, . . . ,vn). Let m = ‖C‖. Let ωmax be the
highest weight of a vote in V . We set D to be a set of up to t − 1 new candidates, such that ‖C‖+ ‖D‖ is
a multiple of t. We set V0 to be a collection of ‖C‖+‖D‖t t-approval votes, where each vote has weight ωmax
and each candidate in C∪D is approved in exactly one of the votes. For each vote vi in V we create a set
Ci = {c1i , . . . ,c
(t−1)(m−t)
i } of candidates and we create a collection of voters Vi = (v1i , . . . ,v
m−t
i ). Each voter v
j
i ,
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1 ≤ j ≤ m− t, has weight ω(vi) and approves of the jth candidate approved by v and of the t− 1 candidates
c
( j−1)(t−1)+1
i , . . . ,c
j(t−1)
i .
We form an election E ′ = (C′,V ′), where C′ = C ∪D∪
⋃n
i=1 Ci and V ′ = V0 +V1 + · · ·+Vn. For each
candidate c, let sc be c’s t-veto score in (C,V ); it is easy to see that c’s t-approval score in E ′ is ωmax + sc.
Furthermore, each candidate c ∈C′−C has t-approval score at most ωmax in E ′.
We form an instance (C′,V ′,W, p,k) of t-approval-WCCAV, where W = (w1, . . . ,wn), and for each i,
1≤ i≤ n, ω(wi) = ω(vi), and wi approves exactly of those candidates that vi disapproves of. It is easy to see
that adding voter wi to t-approval election (C′,V ′) has the same net effect on the scores of the candidates in
C as does deleting vi from t-veto election (C,V ).
Let us now give a reduction from t-approval-WCCDV to t-veto-WCCAV. The idea is the same as in the
previous reduction; the main part of the proof is to show how to implement t-approval scores with t-veto
votes. Let (C,V, p,k) be an instance of t-approval-WCCDV, where V = (v1, . . . ,vn). Let m = ‖C‖ and let
ωmax be the highest weight of a vote in V . We set D to be a set of candidates such that t ≤ ‖D‖ ≤ 2t− 1 and
‖C‖+ ‖D‖= s · t for some integer s, s ≥ 3 (note that for our setting to not be trivial it must be that m > t).
We set V0 to be a collection of 4n(s− 2) votes, each with weight ωmax; each candidate from C is approved in
all these votes whereas each candidate from D is disapproved in at least half of them (since t ≤ ‖D‖ ≤ 2t−1,
it is easy to construct such votes). For each vote vi in V , we create a collection Vi of (s− 1) votes satisfying
the following requirements: (a) each candidate approved in vi is also approved in each of the votes in Vi,
and (b) each candidate not approved in vi, is approved in exactly (s− 2) votes in Vi. (Such votes are easy to
construct: We always place the top t candidates from vi in the top t positions of the vote; for the remaining
positions, in the first vote we place the candidates in some arbitrary, easily computable order, and in each
following vote we shift these candidates cyclically by t positions with respect to the previous vote.) Each
vote in Vi has weight ω(vi).
We form an election E ′ = (C′,V ′), where C′ = C∪D and V ′ = V0 +V1 + · · ·+Vn. For each candidate
c, let sc be c’s t-approval score in (C,V ); it is easy to see that c’s t-veto score in E ′ is 4n(s− 2)ωmax +(s−
2)(∑ni=1 ω(vi))+ sc. Furthermore, each candidate from D has t-veto score at most 3n(s− 2)ωmax in E ′.
We form an instance (C′,V ′,W, p,k) of t-veto-WCCAV, where W = (w1, . . . ,wn), and for each i, 1≤ i≤ n,
ω(wi) =ω(vi), and wi disapproves of exactly those candidates that vi approves of. It is easy to see that adding
voter wi to t-veto election (C′,V ′) has the same net effect on the scores of candidates in C as deleting voter
vi from t-approval election (C,V ) has. Furthermore, since each candidate in D has at least nωmax fewer
points than each candidate in C, the fact that adding wi increases scores of candidates in D does not affect the
correctness of our reduction.
All other remaining cases (WCCDV for 2-approval, WCCAV for 3-approval, WCCAV for 2-veto, and
WCCDV for 3-veto) are NP-complete. Interestingly, in contrast to many other NP-complete weighted elec-
tion problems, we need only a very limited set of weights to make the reductions work.
Theorem 3.12. WCCAV for 2-veto and 3-approval and WCCDV for 2-approval and 3-veto are NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP is immediate, so it suffices to prove NP-hardness. We will first give the proof for
WCCDV for 2-approval. By Theorem 3.11 this also immediately gives the result for WCCAV for 2-veto.
We will reduce from X3C′ from Definition 2.5. Let B = {b1, ...,b3t} and let S = {S1, ...,Sn} be a family of
3-element subsets of B such that every element of B occurs in at least one and in at most three sets in S .
We construct the following instance (C,V, p,k) of WCCDV for 2-approval. We set C = {p}∪{b j | 1 ≤ j ≤
3t}∪{si,s′i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪{d0,d1, . . . ,d3t} (d0,d1, . . . ,d3t are dummy candidates that are used for padding).
For 1 ≤ j ≤ 3t, let ℓ j be the number of sets in S that contain b j. Note that 1 ≤ ℓ j ≤ 3. V consists of the
following voters:
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weight preference order
2 si > s′i > · · ·

 for all 1 ≤ i≤ n and Si = {bi1 ,bi2 ,bi3}
1 si > bi1 > · · ·
1 si > bi2 > · · ·
1 s′i > bi3 > · · ·
2 p > d0 > · · ·
3− ℓ j b j > d j > · · · for all 1≤ j ≤ 3t such that ℓ j < 3.
Note that score(si) = 4, score(s′i) = 3, score(b j) = 3, score(p) = 2, and score(d j)≤ 2. We set k = n+2t
and we claim that S contains an exact cover if and only if p can become a winner after deleting at most
n+ 2t voters.
(⇒): Delete the (n− t) weight-2 voters corresponding to the sets not in the cover and delete the 3t
weight-1 voters corresponding to the sets in the cover. Then the score of p does not change, the score of each
si decreases by 2, the score of each s′i decreases by at least 1, and the score of each b j decreases by 1. So, p
is a winner.
(⇐): We need to delete 3t voters to decrease the score of every b j voter by 1. After deleting these 3t
voters, there are at most t values of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that the score of si and the score of s′i are at most 2.
If there are exactly t values of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that the score of si and the score of s′i are at most 2, then
these t values of i correspond to a cover. If there are less than t values of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that the score
of si and the score of s′i are at most 2, then the remaining voters that are deleted, and there are at most n− t
of them, need to decrease the score of si and/or s′i for more than n− t values of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. But that is not
possible, since there is no voter that approves of both si or s′i and s j or s′j for i 6= j.
Note that this construction uses only weights 1 and 2. In fact, we can establish NP-completeness for
WCCDV for 2-approval for every set of allowed weights of size at least two (note that if the set of weights
has size one, the problem is in P, since this is in essence the unweighted case [Lin12]). Since the reductions
of Theorem 3.11 do not change the set of voter weights, we have the same result for WCCAV for 2-veto.
So, suppose our weight set contains w1 and w2, w2 > w1 > 0. We modify the construction above as
follows. We keep the same set of candidates and we change the voters as follows.
# weight preference order
1 w2 si > s′i > · · ·

 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and Si = {bi1 ,bi2 ,bi3}
1 w1 si > bi1 > · · ·
1 w1 si > bi2 > · · ·
1 w1 s′i > bi3 > · · ·
2 w1 p > d0 > · · · if w2 ≤ 2w1
1 w2 p > d0 > · · · if w2 > 2w1
ℓ− ℓ j w1 b j > d j > · · · for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 3t.
Here, ℓ is the smallest integer such that ℓw1 > max(2w1,w2). Note that ℓ ≥ 3 and so ℓ− ℓ j is never
negative. Note that score(si) = w2 + 2w1, score(s′i) = w2 +w1, score(b j) = ℓw1, score(p) = max(2w1,w2),
and score(d j) ≤ max(2w1,w2). The same argument as above shows that S contains an exact cover if and
only if p can become a winner after deleting at most n+ 2t voters.
We now turn to the proof for WCCDV for 3-veto. Our construction will use only weights 1 and 3. Since
the reductions of Theorem 3.11 do not change the set of voter weights, weights 1 and 3 also suffice to get
NP-completeness for WCCAV for 3-approval. Given the instance of X3C′ described above, we construct the
following instance (C,V, p,k) of WCCDV for 3-veto. We set C = {p}∪B∪{si | 1≤ i≤ n}∪{r,d,d′} (d and
d′ are dummy candidates that are used for padding) and V consists of the following voters:
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# weight preference order
1 3 · · ·> p > si > r 
 for all 1 ≤ i≤ n and Si = {bi1 ,bi2 ,bi3}
1 1 · · ·> p > si > bi1
1 1 · · ·> p > si > bi2
1 1 · · ·> p > si > bi3
3n− 3t 1 · · ·> d > d′ > r
3n− 3 1 · · ·> d > d′ > si for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
3n+ 1− ℓ j 1 · · ·> d > d′ > b j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 3t.
It is more convenient to count the number of vetoes for each candidate than to count the number of
approvals. Note that vetoes(si) = 3n+ 3, vetoes(b j) = 3n+ 1, vetoes(r) = 6n− 3t, vetoes(p) = 6n, and
vetoes(d) = vetoes(d′)≥ 3n. We claim that S contains an exact cover if and only if p can become a winner
(i.e., have a lowest number of vetoes) after deleting at most n+ 2t voters.
(⇒): Delete the (n−t) weight-3 voters corresponding to the sets not in the cover and delete the 3t weight-
1 voters that veto p and that correspond to the sets in the cover. Then vetoes(si) = vetoes(b j) = vetoes(r) =
vetoes(p) = 3n and vetoes(d) = vetoes(d′)≥ 3n. So, p is a winner.
(⇐): We can assume that we delete only voters that veto p. Suppose we delete k1 weight-1 voters and k2
weight-3 voters, k1 + k2 ≤ n+ 2t. After this deletion, vetoes(p) = 6n− k1− 3k2, vetoes(r) = 6n− 3t− 3k2,
and vetoes(b j) ≤ 3n+ 1. In order for p to be a winner, we need vetoes(p) ≤ vetoes(r). This implies that
k1 ≥ 3t. We also need vetoes(p)−vetoes(b j)≤ 0. Since vetoes(p)−vetoes(b j)≥ 6n−k1−3k2− (3n+1)≥
6n− (n+ 2t− k2)− 3k2− 3n− 1 = 2n− 2t− 2k2− 1, it follows that k2 ≥ n− t. So we delete 3t weight-1
votes and n− t weight-3 votes, and after deleting these voters vetoes(p) = 3n. In order for p to be a winner,
we can delete at most one veto for each b j and at most three vetoes for each si. This implies that the set of
deleted weight-1 voters corresponds to a cover.
3.3 Approximation and Greedy Algorithms
When problems are computationally difficult, such as being NP-complete, it is natural to wonder whether
good polynomial-time approximation algorithms exist. So, motivated by the NP-completeness results dis-
cussed earlier in this paper for most cases of WCCAV/WCCDV for t-approval and t-veto, this section studies
greedy and other approximation algorithms for those problems. (Recall that WCCAV is NP-complete for
t-approval, t ≥ 3, and for t-veto, t ≥ 2, and WCCDV is NP-complete for t-approval, t ≥ 2, and for t-veto,
t ≥ 3.) Although we are primarily interested in constructing good approximation algorithms, we are also
interested in cases where particular greedy strategies can be shown to fail to provide good approximation
algorithms, as doing so helps one eliminate such approaches from consideration and sheds light on the ap-
proach’s limits of applicability. First, we will establish a connection to the weighted multicover problem, and
we will use it to obtain approximation results. Then we will obtain an approximation algorithm that will work
by direct action on our problem. Table 3 in Section 5 summarizes our results on approximation algorithms
for t-approval/t-veto WCCAV/WCCDV.
3.3.1 A Weighted Multicover Approach
Let us first consider the extent to which known algorithms for the Set-Cover family of problems apply to our
setting. Specifically, we will use the following multicover problem.
Definition 3.13. An instance of Weighted Multicover (WMC) consists of a set B = {b1, . . . ,bm}, a sequence
r = (r1, . . . ,rm) of nonnegative integers (covering requirements), a collection S = (S1, . . . ,Sn) of subsets of
B, and a sequence ω = (ω1, . . . ,ωn) of positive integers (weights of the sets in S ). The goal is to find a
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minimum-cardinality set I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} such that for each b j ∈ B it holds that r j ≤ ∑
i∈I∧b j∈Si
ωi, or to declare
that no such set exists.
That is, given a WMC instance we seek a smallest collection of subsets from S that satisfies the covering
requirements of the elements of B (keeping in mind that a set of weight ω covers each of its elements ω
times). WMC is an extension of Set-Cover with unit costs. We will not define here the problem known as
covering integer programming (CIP) (see [KY05]). However, that problem will be quite important to us here.
The reason is that we observe that WMC is a special case of CIP (with multiplicity constraints but) without
packing constraints; footnote 4 below is in effect describing how to embed our problem in that problem.
An approximation algorithm of Kolliopoulos and Young [KY05] for CIP (with multiplicity constraints but)
without packing constraints, applied to the special case of WMC, gives the following result.4
Theorem 3.14 (Kolliopoulos and Young [KY05]). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that when given an
instance of WMC in which each set contains at most t elements gives an O(logt)-approximation.
For t-approval both WCCAV and WCCDV naturally translate to equivalent WMC instances. We consider
WCCAV first. Let (C,V,W, p,k) be an instance of t-approval-WCCAV, where W = (w1, . . . ,wn) is the collec-
tion of voters that we may add. We assume without loss of generality that each voter in W ranks p among its
top t candidates (i.e., approves of p).
We form an instance (B,r,S ,ω) of WMC as follows. We set B = C−{p}. For each c ∈ B, we set
its covering requirement to be rc = score(C,V )(c)⊖ score(C,V )(p), where i⊖ j =de f max(0, i− j). For each
vote w ∈W , let Sw be the set of candidates that w does not approve of. By our assumption regarding each
voter ranking p among its top t candidates, no Sw contains p. We set S = (Sw1 , . . . ,Swn) and we set ω =
(ω(w1), . . . ,ω(wn)). It is easy to see that a set I ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} is a solution to this instance of WMC (that
is, I satisfies all covering requirements) if and only if adding the voters {wi | i ∈ I} to the election (C,V )
ensures that p is a winner. The reason for this is the following: If we add voter wi to the election then for
each candidate c ∈ Swi , the difference between the score of c and the score of p decreases by ω(wi), and for
each candidate c 6∈ Swi this difference does not change. The covering requirements are set to guarantee that
p’s score will match or exceed the scores of all candidates in the election.
We stress that in the above construction we did not assume t to be a constant. Indeed, the construction
applies to t-veto just as well as to t-approval. So using Theorem 3.14 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.15. There is a polynomial-time O(logm)-approximation algorithm for t-approval-WCCAV.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm that when given an instance of t-veto-WCCAV (t ∈N) gives an O(logt)-
approximation.
Proof. It suffices to use the reduction of t-approval/t-veto to WMC and apply the algorithm from
Theorem 3.14. For the case of t-approval, the reduction guarantees that each set in the WMC instance
contains at most m elements. For the case of t-veto, each of these sets contains at most t elements.
We can obtain analogous results for the case of t-approval/t-veto and WCCDV. One can either provide a
direct reduction from these problems to WMC or notice that the reductions given in the proof of Theorem 3.11
maintain approximation properties.
4This follows from the sentence starting “Our second algorithm finds a solution” on page 496 of [KY05] (which itself follows from
their Theorem 8), keeping in mind that we have none of their so-called packing constraints, and so we may take it that what they call ε
is one and the matrix and vector they call B and b won’t be a factor here. Their vector a corresponds to our r j’s; the element in the jth
row and ith column of their matrix A will for us be set to ωi if Si contains b j and 0 otherwise; we set their cost vector c to be a vector of
all 1’s; we set their multiplicity vector d to be a vector of all 1’s; their vector x corresponds to the characteristic function of our I; and
their α will be Theorem 3.14’s bound t on the number of elements of B contained in any Si .
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Theorem 3.16. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that when given an instance of t-approval-WCCDV
(t ∈ N) gives an O(logt)-approximation. There is a polynomial-time O(logm)-approximation algorithm for
t-veto-WCCDV.
3.3.2 A Direct Approach
Using algorithms for WMC, we were able to obtain relatively strong algorithms for WCCAV/WCCDV under
t-approval and t-veto. However, with this approach we did not find approximation algorithms for t-approval-
WCCAV and t-veto-WCCDV whose approximation ratios do not depend on the size of the election. In the
following we will seek direct algorithms for these problems.
We now show that a very simple greedy approach yields a polynomial-time t-approximation algorithm
for t-approval-WCCAV and t-veto-WCCDV. (Recall that this means that in cases when making p win is
possible, the number of voters our algorithm adds/deletes to reach victory is never more than t times that of
the optimal set of additions/deletions.)
Let GBW (greedy by weight) define the following very simple algorithm for WCCAV. (The votes are
the weighted t-approval vectors induced by the preferences of the voters.) (Pre)discard all unregistered votes
that do not approve of the preferred candidate p. Order the (remaining) unregistered votes from heaviest
to lightest, breaking ties in voter weights in some simple, transparent way (for concreteness, let us say by
lexicographic order on the votes’ representations). GBW goes through the unregistered votes in that order,
and as it reaches each vote it adds the vote exactly if the vote disapproves of at least one candidate whose
score (i.e., total weight of approvals) is currently strictly greater than that of p. It stops successfully when p
has become a winner and unsuccessfully if before that happens the algorithm runs out of votes to consider.
The following result says that GBW is a t-approximation algorithm for t-approval-WCCAV, and also for
t-veto-WCCDV, using the obvious analogue of GBW for t-veto-WCCDV, which we will also call GBW.5
Theorem 3.17. Let t ≥ 3. The polynomial-time greedy algorithm GBW is a t-approximation algorithm for
t-approval-WCCAV and t-veto-WCCDV; and there are instances in which GBW’s approximation factor on
each of these problems is no better than t.
We prove Theorem 3.17’s upper and lower bound parts separately, through the following two lemmas
from which the theorem immediately follows.
Lemma 3.18. Let t ≥ 3. There are instances on which the polynomial-time greedy algorithm GBW has an
approximation factor on t-approval-WCCAV no better than t. There are instances on which the polynomial-
time greedy algorithm GBW has an approximation factor on t-veto-WCCDV no better than t.
Lemma 3.19. Let t ≥ 3. The polynomial-time greedy algorithm GBW is a t-approximation algorithm for
t-approval-WCCAV and t-veto-WCCDV.
The proof of our lower-bound claim, Lemma 3.18, consists of a somewhat detailed pair of constructions,
and is of less interest than the upper-bound part of Theorem 3.17, namely Lemma 3.19. We thus defer to the
appendix the proof of Lemma 3.18.
Proof of Lemma 3.19. Let us now prove the two claims that GBW is a t-approximation algorithm. We will
prove the result for t = 3 and WCCAV, but it will be immediately clear that our proof straightforwardly
generalizes to all greater t; and the WCCDV case follows using Theorem 3.11.
5For completeness and clarity, we describe what we mean by GBW for t-veto-WCCDV. Order all votes that do not approve of p from
heaviest to lightest, breaking ties in voter weights in some simple, transparent way (for concreteness, let us say by lexicographic order
on the votes’ representations). GBW goes through these votes in that order, and as it reaches each vote it removes the vote exactly if the
vote approves of at least one candidate whose score (i.e., total weight of approvals) is currently strictly greater than that of p. It stops
successfully when p has become a winner and unsuccessfully if before that happens the algorithm runs out of such votes to consider.
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Clearly GBW is a polynomial-time algorithm. Consider a given input instance of t-approval-WCCAV,
with preferred candidate p. Without loss of generality, assume all unregistered voters approve of p. We will
say a candidate “has a gap” (under the current set of registered voters and whatever unregistered voters have
already been added) if that candidate has strictly more weight of approvals than p does. For each candidate
d who has a gap, d 6= p, define id to be the minimum number of unregistered voters one has to add to remove
d’s gap; that is, if one went from heaviest to lightest among the unregistered voters, adding in turn each that
disapproved of d, id is the number of voters one would add before d no longer had a gap. If for any candidate
d it holds that no integer realizes id , then control is impossible using the unregistered voter set. Clearly,
any successful addition of voters must add at least maxd id voters (the max throughout this proof is over all
candidates initially having a gap).
Let us henceforth assume that control is possible in the input case. We will show that after having added
at most 3 ·maxd id voters GBW will have made p a winner, and so GBW is a 3-approximation algorithm. By
way of contradiction, suppose that after 3 ·maxd id additions some candidate, z, still has a gap.
Case 1 [In at least maxd id of the first 3 ·maxd id votes added by GBW, z is not approved]. Since for the
last one of these to be added z must still have had a gap before the addition, each earlier vote considered
that disapproved z had a gap for z when it was considered and so would have been added when reached. So,
keeping in mind that iz ≤maxd id , we in fact must have added the iz heaviest voters disapproving of z, and so
contrary to the assumption, z no longer has a gap after these additions.
Case 2 [Case 1 does not hold]. So z is approved in at least 1+2 ·maxd id of the added votes. What made
the final one of the added votes, call it v′, eligible for addition? It must be that some candidate, say y, still had
a gap just before v′ was added.
Case 2a [y is disapproved in at least maxd id of the 2 ·maxd id votes added before v′ that approved z].
Then, since until y’s gap was removed no unregistered voters disapproving of y would be excluded by GBW,
y’s iy heaviest voters will have been added. So contrary to Case 2’s assumption, y does not have a gap when
we get to adding vote v′.
Case 2b [Case 2 holds but Case 2a does not]. Then y is approved in at least 1+maxd id of the 2 ·maxd id
votes before v′ that GBW added that approve z. So we have 1+maxd id votes added approving of exactly
z and y. But then who made the last of those 1+maxd id votes, call it v′′, eligible to be added? It must be
that some candidate w had a gap up through v′′. But at the moment before adding v′′ we would have added
maxd id ≥ iw votes approving exactly z and y and so disapproving w, and since w allegedly still had a gap,
we while doing so under GBW would have in fact added the iw heaviest voters disapproving of w, and so
w’s gap would have been removed before v′′, so contrary to our assumption w was not the gap that made v′′
eligible.
One might naturally wonder how GBW performs on t-veto-WCCAV and t-approval-WCCDV. By an
argument far easier than that used in the above proof of Lemma 3.19, in both of these cases GBW provides a
t-approximation algorithm.
Theorem 3.20. GBW is a t-approximation algorithm for t-veto-WCCAV. GBW is a t-approximation algo-
rithm for t-approval-WCCDV.
Proof. Consider t-veto-WCCAV. Let p be the preferred candidate. For each candidate d with an initial
positive “gap” relative to the preferred candidate p (i.e., a surplus over p in total weight of approvals), let
id be as defined in the proof of Lemma 3.19. (Recall that id is the number of votes we would need to add
to remove the surplus of d over p if we took the unregistered votes, discarded all that didn’t simultaneously
approve p and disapprove d, and then added those one at a time from heaviest to lightest until the gap was
removed.) Clearly, ∑ id , where the sum is taken over those candidates with an initial surplus relative to p, is
an upper bound on the number of votes added by GBW. This is true since GBW works by adding extra votes
from heaviest to lightest, restricted to those vetoing a candidate who at that point has a positive gap relative to
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p; so under GBW each gap will be closed by the largest weight votes that address it. On the other hand, in any
overall optimal solution id is a lower bound on the smallest number of votes from that solution’s added-vote
set that would suffice to remove d’s positive gap (since it takes id even if we use the heaviest votes addressing
the gap). In the overall optimal solution each added vote narrows at most t gaps. So GBW’s solution uses at
worst t times as many added votes as does the optimal solution.
The claim for t-approval-WCCDV follows by Theorem 3.11.
This result replaces a flawed claim in an earlier version of this paper that GBW and some of its cousins
do not provide O(1) approximations for these problems. Of course, having a t-approximation for these
two problems is not wildly exciting, since for these problems the multicover-based approach from earlier
in this section showed that for some function f (t), with f (t) = O(logt), we even have f (t)-approximation
algorithms for these problems. However, if the constant of the “big oh” of that other algorithm is large, it
is possible that for sufficiently small values of t the above approach may give a better approximation. Also,
we feel that it is interesting to learn about the behavior of explicit heuristics, especially attractive approaches
such as greedy algorithms.
4 Related Work
The study of the complexity of (unweighted) electoral control was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92], who considered constructive control by adding/deleting/partitioning candidates/voters un-
der the plurality rule and under the Condorcet rule (that is, the rule that chooses Condorcet winner whenever
there is one, and has no winners otherwise). The various types of control model at least some of the flavor
of actions that occur in the real world, such as voter suppression and targeted get-out-the-vote drives (see the
survey of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [FHH10] for more examples and discussions). A
major motivation for the study of control was to obtain “complexity barrier” results, that is, results that show
that detecting opportunities for various control attacks is computationally difficult. In particular, Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick focused on NP-hardness as the measure of computational difficulty.
This research direction was continued by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07], who were
the first to study destructive control attacks on elections. Since then, many authors have studied electoral
control in many varied settings and under many different rules; we refer the reader to the survey [FHH10].
Some recent research, not covered in that survey, includes complexity-of-control results for the t-approval
family of rules [Lin12], for Bucklin’s rule (and for fallback, its extension for truncated votes) [ER10, EPR11],
for maximin [FHH11b], for range voting [Men], and for Schultze’s rule and the ranked pairs rule [PX12].
In the present paper, we compare control and manipulation. The recent paper [FHH13] studies settings in
which both control and manipulation are occurring. Researchers have, in the quite different setting of electing
members to fill a fixed-size, multimember panel, defined variants of control that have coexisting constructive
and destructive aspects [MPRZ08]. There is also work analyzing counting variants of control [WF12], where
the goal is not only to decide if a given control attack is possible, but also to count the number of ways in
which this attack can be carried out.
The complexity-barrier research line turned out to be very successful. For most voting rules that were
considered, a significant number of control attacks are NP-hard. Indeed, it is even possible to construct an
artificial election system resistant to all types of control attacks [HHR09]. However, there are also a number of
results that suggest that in practice the complexity barrier might not be as strong as one might at first think. For
example, Faliszewski et al. [FHHR11] and Brandt et al. [BBHH10] have shown that if the votes are restricted
to being single-peaked, then many control problems that are known to be NP-complete become polynomial-
time solvable. Indeed, this often holds even if elections are just nearly single-peaked [FHH11a], as many
real-world elections seem to be. Similarly, some initial experimental results of Rothe and Schend [RS12]—
published very recently—suggest that, at least under certain distributions and settings, some NP-hard control
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WCCAV WCCDV WCM
Plurality P (Thm. 3.1) P (Thm. 3.1) P [CSL07]
t-approval, 2 ≤ t < m P (Thm. 3.1) P (Thm. 3.1) NP-comp. [HH07]
Borda NP-comp. (Thm. 3.2) NP-comp. (Thm. 3.2) NP-comp. [HH07]
α = (α1, . . . ,αm),
‖{α1, . . . ,αm}‖ ≥ 3
NP-comp. (Thm. 3.3) NP-comp. (Thm. 3.3) NP-comp. [HH07]
Llull (3 candidates) NP-comp. (Cor. 3.8) NP-comp. (Cor. 3.8) P [FHS08]
(weak)Condorcet-
consistent rules
NP-hard (Thm. 3.6) NP-hard (Thm. 3.6) various
complexities
Table 1: Our results for the complexity of control by adding/deleting voters in weighted elections for any
fixed number of candidates, m≥ 3, compared to the complexity of weighted coalitional manipulation.
problems can be solved in practice on many instances. As part of a different line of research, Xia [Xia12] has
studied the asymptotic behavior of the number of voters that have to be added to/deleted from a randomly
constructed election in a successful control action.
There are a number of other problems that involving changing the structure of elections. These problems
include candidate cloning [EFS11, EFS12] (where it is possible to replace a given candidate c with a number
of its clones), or the possible winner problem when new alternatives join [MLCM10, XLM11] (where some
additional, not yet ranked candidates can be introduced). This last problem is also related to the possible
winner problem with truncated ballots [BFLR12].
The only papers that directly raise the issue of weighted control are, to the best of our knowledge, the the-
ses of Russell [Rus07] and Lin [Lin12]. However, we also mention the papers of Baumeister et al. [BRR+12],
and of Perek et al. [PFPR13], where the authors, in effect, consider problems of affecting the result of an elec-
tion through picking the weights of the voters. (The paper of Perek et al. motivates its study differently, but in
effect studies a constrained variant of choosing voter weights.) Their problems are similar to, though different
from, simultaneous (multimode) addition and deletion of voters [FHH11b].
This paper has given f (·)-approximation results for weighted election control problems. Elkind and
Faliszewski [EF10] have given a 2-approximation algorithm for a weighted, bribery-related case.
5 Conclusions
We have studied voter control under a number of voting rules, including scoring protocols, families of scoring
protocols, and the (weak)Condorcet-consistent rules. We have shown that the complexity of voter control can
be quite different from the complexity of weighted coalitional manipulation: there are natural voting rules
for which weighted coalitional manipulation is easy but weighted voter control is hard, and there are natural
rules where the opposite is the case. Furthermore, we have shown that for weighted voter control under
t-approval and t-veto, there are good, natural approximation algorithms. Our results for voter control in
weighted elections are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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WCCAV WCCDV
t-approval
t = 2 P (Thm. 3.9) NP-complete (Thm. 3.12)
t = 3 NP-complete (Thm. 3.12) NP-complete [Lin12]
t ≥ 4 NP-complete [Lin12] NP-complete [Lin12]
t-veto
t = 2 NP-complete (Thm. 3.12) P (Thm. 3.10)
t = 3 NP-complete [Lin12] NP-complete (Thm. 3.12)
t ≥ 4 NP-complete [Lin12] NP-complete [Lin12]
Table 2: The complexity of control by adding and deleting voters for t-approval and t-veto with an unbounded
number of candidates.
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A Additional Details Related to Section 3.3
We present here the deferred proof of Lemma 3.18 and some other details related to Section 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.18. Our goal is to show that GBW sometimes really does use fully t times the optimal
number of added/deleted votes, for the cases in question. Examples are (somewhat detailed but) not hard to
construct, and the lower bound even holds for t = 2, though in Section 3.2 we obtained an exact solution by a
different approach. However, one does have to be careful to set the “gap” pattern created by the unregistered
voters to be a realizable one. For our t-approval-WCCAV construction, this will be easy to do directly. For
our t-veto-WCCDV construction, we will establish realizability through a small tool—which we hope may
prove useful elsewhere—that lets one set up certain patterns of gaps. We state the tool below as Tool A.1.
Fix any t ∈ {2,3,4, . . .}. We will now construct an instance of t-approval-WCCAV on which GBW uses
t times as many additions as the optimal strategy. Our construction will have 2t candidates: the preferred
candidate p, candidates a1, . . . ,at , and candidates d1, . . . ,dt−1. Now, suppose that under the votes of the
registered voters, the “gaps” are as follows. For each candidate ai, the total weight of approvals of ai exceeds
the total weight of approvals of p by exactly 2t. And for each candidate di, the total weight of approvals of
di equals the total weight of approvals of p. This can easily be realized, namely by our registered voter set
being one weight-2t voter who approves of each ai.
Our set of unregistered voters will be as follows. There will be one unregistered voter, call it “nice,” of
weight 2t, who approves of p and each of the t−1 candidates di, and disapproves of each of the t candidates
ai. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, we will have a single unregistered voter, call it α j, of weight 3t, who approves of p
and of each ai other than a j, and disapproves of a j and all the di’s.
Note that GBW will add all t voters αi. But ideal would be to add the single voter called “nice,” since
doing so suffices to make p a winner. So for each t ≥ 2 we have constructed a setting where GBW for
t-approval-WCCAV takes t times more than the optimal number of added votes.
It also holds that for each t ≥ 2, we can similarly construct a setting where GBW for t-veto-WCCDV takes
t times more than the optimal number of deleted votes, and can prove that setting to be realizable. In fact,
we can do so by following something of the flavor of the above scheme, except with a slightly different vote
set that adjusts it to handle the case of deleting voters, and with more care regarding realizability. Here is the
construction. Fix any t ∈ {2,3,4, . . .}. Our candidate set will again be the preferred candidate p, candidates
a1, . . . ,at , and candidates d1, . . . ,dt−1. Let us specify the voter set. We will put into our voter set a collection
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of weight-1 votes such that the gaps in total approval weight relative to d1 created by those votes are as
follows. Each of d2 through dt−1 have the same total approval weight as d1. The total approval weight of p
exceeds that of d1 by 3t2 + 3t. And the total approval weight of each ai exceeds that of d1 by 3t2.
As Tool A.1 below, we will observe that for 2t-candidate t-approval voting, any gap pattern where the
gaps are all multiples of t can be realized. Since in the current proof we are using 2t-candidate t-veto, and
that is the same as 2t-candidate t-approval, Tool A.1 applies here. In particular, Tool A.1 easily builds a set
of weight-1 votes realizing precisely our desired set of gaps. (The exact number of weight-1 votes used in
this construction is not important. However, from the gaps mentioned above and the vote-set size mentioned
in the tool, the precise number is easily seen to be (3t + 3+ t(3t))(2t− 1).)
We are not yet done building our voter set. We will also have in our voter set one voter, call it “nice,”
of weight 2t, who approves of exactly all t of the ai’s. And for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, we will have one voter of
weight 3t who approves of exactly a j and all t− 1 of the di’s.
Under the entire set of votes created above—the votes from the tool combined with “nice” and the other
t votes just mentioned—it is easy to see that d1 is a candidate having the least total approval weight, and it is
tied in total approval weight with each other di. The total approval weight of p exceeds that of d1 by 3t. And
each ai exceeds d1 in total approval weight by 5t.
However, in light of the pattern of votes and weights we have here, it is clear that GBW (in its version for
t-veto) will delete the t weight-3t voters. (Note that the votes added by Tool A.1 are all weight-1 votes, and
so are highly unattractive to GBW.) But ideal would be to delete the single voter called “nice,” since doing
so suffices to make p a winner. So for each t ≥ 2 we have constructed a realizable setting where GBW for
t-veto-WCCDV takes t times more than the optimal number of deleted votes.
Within the above proof, we referred to and used a small tool that can build certain patterns of vote weight
gaps in certain approval elections. It would be an overreach to claim that this is a McGarvey-like tool, since
this is a different setting than, and is a far less flexible result than, the famous theorem of McGarvey [McG53].
However, it in a small way is a tool that perhaps might be useful elsewhere, and so we state and prove this
modest tool.
Tool A.1. Let t ≥ 2. Let n1, . . . ,n2t−1 be any list of nonnegative integers each divisible by t. Then there exists
a collection of t-approval votes, over 2t candidates, such that under those votes, relative to the candidate
getting the fewest approvals, the list of gaps in number of approvals between that candidate and the other
2t−1 candidates is precisely (n1, . . . ,n2t−1). Furthermore, this can be done with (2t−1)(∑ni)/t unweighted
(i.e., weight 1) votes. It alternatively can be done with (2t−1)2 weighted votes (or even (2t−1)‖{i | ni 6= 0}‖
weighted votes).
Proof. Consider an election with 2t candidates, where the votes cast are t-approval votes. Consider the
collection of 2t− 1 votes, each of weight one, in which the votes all approve of a particular candidate (for
this example, let that one be the first candidate), and the remaining t − 1 approvals cyclically rotate around
the other candidates. So the t-approval votes, viewed as bit vectors, are these: 11t−1 0t , 101t−1 0t−1, . . .,
10t 1t−1, 110t 1t−2, . . ., 11t−1 0t 1. Note that the first candidate is approved in all 2t− 1 of those votes, and
each other candidate is approved in exactly t − 1 of those votes. So this collection of votes sets a gap of t
in favor of the first candidate, between the total approval weight of the first candidate and that of each other
candidate And the difference in total approval weight between each other pair of candidates is zero.
Given a gap pattern as stated in the tool, where each gap above the least-approved candidate (call that
candidate c) is a multiple of t, we can simply use the approach of the above paragraph repeatedly, to boost
each other candidate, d, one at a time to whatever multiple of t it is supposed to exceed c by in total approval
weight. (In this, d will play the role “the first candidate” did in the previous paragraph.) If d’s surplus
relative to c is kt and we wish to use only weight-1 votes, we can do this for d with k(2t−1) weight-1 votes.
Otherwise, we can do this for d with 2t− 1 weight-k votes. So the total number of votes used is as given in
the statement of this tool.
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This appendix is not seeking to provide a comprehensive study of which gap collections are realizable
under t-approval voting, nor is it seeking to find the smallest number of voters needed to realize realizable
gap collection. That is an interesting direction for study, but is not our goal here. However, we mention that
there clearly exist some gap collections that cannot be realized. For example, the “then there exists” claim of
Tool A.1 is not even always true if one removes the assumption of divisibility by t. An example showing this
is the following. Consider a 4-candidate setting where votes will be 2-approval votes, and we desire a gap list
relative to the least-approved candidate of (1,1,1), i.e., each of the other candidates has one more approval
than does the least-approved candidate. Clearly, the total number of approvals of any set of votes achieving
this is 4B+ 3, where B is whatever number of approvals the least-approved candidate happens to get under
the vote set one is trying, and so the total number of approvals is odd. However, any vote set of 2-approval
votes has an even total number of approvals. So this gap collection cannot be realized.
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